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There has been a progression in the field of economics from modeling the 
individual as an atomistic entity, to one born with a social identity.  This dissertation is 
a collection of four chapters that examine how the individual’s social environment 
constrains choice and institutions can play a role in overcoming these constraints.  To 
approach this line of economics topics are explored from ethnic conflict and 
cooperation, discrimination, literacy traps and the ambiguous effect of consumer 
activism.  
 The first chapter models the individual’s choice of culture as a way to modify 
her innate identity.  Culture norms are shown to impact the level and stability of 
cooperation that is attainable in two otherwise uncooperative social groups.  The 
chapter demonstrates that even when individuals are given a choice to shed 
unproductive characteristics the option may not be chosen.  The implication is that 
individuals of one social identity may be trapped in a Pareto inferior equilibrium.  It is 
shown that coordination from an outside party is may be necessary for social change.  
The model also demonstrates how the incentives of the various identities may conflict 
leading to social norms that discourage progressive change among individuals of 
various groups. 
 The second chapter is an empirical test for taste based discrimination in small 
firm access to US credit markets.  It uses the Federal Reserve Bank’s Survey of Small 
Business Finances.  One unique element of the chapter is that it explicitly controls for 
the possibility that loan officers statistically discriminate.  Previous tests did not allow 
for statistical discrimination and thus suffered omitted various bias.  Additionally this 
chapter explores the possibility of selection bias.  Evidence of both types of 
discrimination are documented and when selection bias is controlled for, evidence of 
taste based discrimination increased. 
 The third chapter, jointly written with Atal, V., Basu, K. and Lee, T. 
demonstrates the possibility for a community to get caught with a low level of literacy 
trap.  Individuals in the community do not find it worthwhile to invest in skills 
because others in the community do not have skills.  The model demonstrates the 
importance of institutions and policy that can solve the coordination problem in the 
individual’s education strategy. 
 The fourth chapter presents a model in which consumer activism impacts the 
price of using child labor.  By incorporating social externalities, the impact of 
consumer activism on child labor becomes ambiguous.   
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Chapter 1  
The Appearance of Moderation: 
The Economics of Choosing Individual Identity 
Introduction 
 How do social markers become politicized enough to mobilize populations to 
war?  What forces create a world where Yugoslavians become warring Serbians and 
Croatians; a Danish cartoon has the power to spark riots and brutal killings 
worldwide?  Nigeria has lost hundreds of people as competing sides defend the 
sanctity of their God.  Not to mention Rwandan.  With the death and destruction 
caused by racial, ethnic and religious polarization, mutual cooperation clearly seems 
preferable to these flares of reality. This paper explores an instance where the adoption 
of a norm, can build trust.  It also shows how costly and fragile that trust can be. 
 Although sociologists and anthropologists have a tradition of studying the 
individual in relation to her society its place in economics has until recently been 
sparse.  There was a profound impact on the economic profession with Akerlof and 
Kranton's (2000) "Economics and Identity" which placed considerations of identity 
into the individual's preferences.  Subsequently, Basu (2005) and Sen (2006) brought 
attention to the venomous and divisive potential of identity when the behavior of an 
individual is attributed to all individuals of her social group.  While Sen's focus is on 
the multiple identities a person might associate with and the conflict that can arise as a 
result, Basu shows how a small minority of extremists can cause conflict between two 
otherwise peaceful groups.  In closely related work, Darity, Mason and Stewart (2006)  
use an evolutionary game-theoretic framework to model the persistence of racialized 
identities.  While their focus is not on resolving conflict between two competing 
groups, their work gives insight into some of the conditions that make for a more 
polarized society.  In addition to the theoretical literature, empirical research by those 
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such as Hoff and Pande (2006) has engaged in projects to quantify the cost of social 
stigma. 
 The early economic works on identity treat a person's social identity as a 
parameter in her utility function, i.e. a constant an individual is either lucky or unlucky 
enough to be born with.  Of course, much of how an individual is seen by the world is 
impacted by her choices.  Although the individual is constrained by the outside world, 
it is a dramatic simplification to model her as having no choice in her social identity.  
Fryer and Jackson (2003) attempt to overcome this shortfall in previous works by 
giving the individual this choice.  In an adaptation of a signaling model in the spirit of 
Akerlof (1970), Arrow (1971), and Spence (1973) the individual shapes how society 
views her by her investments in social and productive capital.   As a result Fryer and 
Jackson (2003) provide insight into social pressures for individuals to perform 
unproductive activities.  Although Fryer and Jackson (2003) has results consistent 
with some otherwise puzzling empirical realities, its modeling of the individual's 
choice is not completely satisfactory as it assumes the presence of a peer-group that 
cares neither about its member's productive ability nor well-being.  A peer group, 
however, is made of a collection of individuals, all of whom care about their own 
well-being.  To model the impact of a social identity on an individual, the preferences 
of the individuals in the society, both in and out of the peer group, should shape the 
preferences of the peer-group.  The most striking results of Fryer and Jackson (2003) 
break down when the peer-group desires its members to be productive elements of 
society. 
 From middle class Blacks in the United States who Wilson (1980) wrote, made 
"a conspicuous effort to disassociate themselves from the black masses" (p. 21) to 
lower caste groups in India, for example the Namasudra that Banjeree-Dube (2008) 
wrote, "constructed a collective self-image radically different" from the historical 
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view,  history has provided examples of individuals and groups of individuals making 
proactive choices with the hope of changing their social position.  To model the peer-
group's preferences as fixed and independent of the group members' preferences 
precludes such choices.  Indeed, excluding these changes precludes individual 
rationality.  When an individual is assigned a social identity that results in an inferior 
social status and a low well-being the economist should examine the incentive an 
individual has to change society's perceptions and the constraints on this choice.  It is 
on this bilateral relationship between the individual and her social identity that this 
model focuses.  Although a social identity shapes the individual, the social identity 
exists only as a collection of individuals and the objectives of a peer-group depend on 
the preferences of its members.  Thus the goal of this paper is to continue a 
progression in the economics literature from the atomistic individual, to the individual 
born into and with a social identity, to an individual with some choice, however 
constrained, in shaping how society views her. 
 The individual's choice is the focus of this paper; although to conceive of it as 
completely free and costless would be naive.  Indeed, moving against mainstream 
attitudes, actions, and beliefs can have very uncomfortable results.  Examples abound 
in the anthropological literature.  In studying Muslim and Christian relationships in the 
Philippines, Lacar (1980) estimated that as recently as 1980, only 12-18% of parents 
agreed with such a marriage and 78% of parents were kept in the dark about such 
courtships. Finally, he notes a "dropping out" of religion by the inter-religious couples, 
which he supposes is caused by an avoidance of conflict which suggests that there is a 
cost of cooperating with those of the other culture. 
 Sociological and anthropological literature also suggests that in polarized 
societies, teaching stereotypes about hostile groups and the indoctrination of fear is 
common practice.  Lacar (1980) documents such child-rearing practices and provides 
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evidence of children who are proficient in identifying others as members of a visual 
group.  In the Philippines in the 1980's, Lacar (1980) notes, Christian children were 
taught to use the derogatory "Moro" to describe their Muslim counterparts while 
Muslim parents whisper "land grabber" to their children behind their Christian 
neighbors' backs. Similarly, Bar-tal (1996) observes that Israeli children as young as 
eight use visible cultural traits, such as style of dress and language, to distinguish good 
and friendly Arabs from the bad Arabs that that kill Jews. 
 Another cost is revealed by Brewer and Campbell (1976) who offer a 
compelling survey of East African cultural attitudes. Their work describes how 
colonialism brought together groups who were previously isolated and eventually 
defined them in ethnic blocs determined by the stereotypes attributed to those groups. 
One particular stereotype noted in the survey is the "thriftlessness" of the Luo. It is 
difficult to imagine the "thrifty" Kikuyu embarking on a business venture with such 
wasteful people. When evaluating a business venture with a Luo, a Kikuyu who 
believes in this stereotype will factor in this cost even if this stereotype does not fit the 
particular Luo.  In parallel, a Luo might over exert his energies trying to overcome this 
stereotype in meetings with a Kikuyu.  In both cases cooperation across ethnic groups 
comes at a greater cost than within ethnic groups. 
 Basu (2005) suggests that a key to overcoming these prohibitive costs is 
recognizing the fallacy of such stereotypes and attributing historical actions to those 
who committed them as opposed to attributing them to a whole group. If this ideal 
could only be achieved the cost to cooperating with other groups would be greatly 
diminished and the cooperative equilibrium would be possible. This model 
presupposes that this identity-blind world does not exist.  To overcome a lack of 
cooperation individuals must join groups, i.e. choose a culture, and for each set of 
norms, strategies, the possible increase in inter-ethnic cooperation is explored. 
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 There is a long literature of institutional, group, and norm formation in 
economics. Greif, Milgrom, and Weingast (1995) present evidence that when 11th 
century merchants formed groups such as the "Maghribi traders" trade in North Africa 
doubled. The evidence relating group formation to productivity is however far from 
one-sided. In 1574 Elizabeth I enacted sumptuary laws that restricted the dress of the 
poor "so that differences of estate may be known by their apparel". Apparently the 
group of well dressed people in the population had become too large for membership 
in the group to be a credible signal of membership in a particular status. As a result the 
Queen restricted group membership. In 1691 North (1691) commented that the law 
had reduced the industry and ingenuity of England. The Queen was concerned about 
the stability of a signaling status of a style of clothing and thus restricted group 
membership. North had less issue with informational concerns and instead addressed 
the effect the Queen's order had on the population's incentives to engage in enterprise. 
 In this and a companion paper Gray (2009) explore the trade-off between 
stability and inter-ethnic cooperation when the purpose of signaling is to increase 
inter-ethnic cooperation.  The two papers demonstrate that 1) signaling, i.e. group 
formation, can be an effective means of inter-ethnic cooperation, 2) for the highest 
amount of inter-ethnic cooperation groups must be exclusive in that they do not 
cooperate with non-group members, 3) when groups are non-exclusive the equilibria 
with the highest level of cooperation are unstable and inter-ethnic cooperation can be 
unstable. 
Model 
 Following Basu (2005), society has a set, S, of individuals.  Each individual 
has two characteristics. For person ,  is her innate, visible characteristic; 
for example, her ethnicity.  Her second characteristic is private.  It captures a cost that 
she incurs when she cooperates with individuals of a different visible identity.  These 
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costs may be associated with stereotypes and prejudices she holds against the other 
group's members, but they may also be the result of physical impediments such as the 
costs of communicating across the different languages and customs of each ethnicity.  
A person , with visible type  has invisible characteristic  and is 
summarized by the ordered pair . 
 Community engagement is modeled as a random matching game.  One could 
imagine the players deciding whether or not they should build a community school, 
form a worker's union, or engage in a cooperative business venture.  In their meeting 
they can choose to be cooperative and play C, or to take a more aggressive stance in 
their meeting and play A.  As individuals are matched in pairs and each has two 
possible actions there are four possible outcomes to a match.  The monetary payoffs to 
each possible match are described in Table 1-A.  The outcomes are such that the 
literature describes the game as an Assurance Game.  It is one of trust.  Table 1-A 
describes the situation of two people working together on a project where each person 
hopes for a cooperative outcome.  As long as there is mutual trust between the players 
a high payoff equilibrium with each person working cooperatively will be reached.  
The less optimistic result is one where a lack of believable assurances leads to the 
Pareto-inferior aggressive equilibrium where each individual chooses to play A. 
 
 
 
 
 
 Society is modeled so that individuals of the same ethnicity have the necessary 
networks of family and friends to maintain the trust needed to reach the cooperative 
equilibrium in meetings among each other.  In meetings across ethnicity, the game is 
Table 1-A 
      
i \ j  C   D  
C  10, 10  1, 8  
D  8, 1  2, 2  
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different.  When people of different ethnicities are matched, the benefit to cooperation 
is lower for each individual i by the amount .  The payoffs to inter-ethnic meetings 
are in Table 1-B.  Neither person knows the other's cost of cooperation.  They might 
only form expectation of the cost based on the known distribution of cost for each 
ethnicity.  When  for  there are some people, "extremist", in the 
society that never want to cooperate across ethnic groups.  It is the possibility of being 
matched with an extremist that causes inter-ethnic cooperation to break down in this 
model. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
An individual has many visible characteristics.  One's ethnicity falls into the 
small category of innate and fixed features.  Others, such as level of education (visible 
from the enunciation and usage of certain words or from the degrees from an office 
wall), style of dress, or membership to a business or political organization are subject 
to individual choice.  In all of these spheres an individual might find it worthwhile to 
adopt such features in order to be identified by another group, in this case the other 
ethnicity, as an individual with low cost of cooperation.  Here we present an extension 
of the Basu (2005) framework that focuses on the individual's choice of a particular 
visual characteristic, her culture, and explore the conditions in which as a result inter-
ethnic cooperation may be reached. 
 We introduce a period 0, before the random matching games, where 
individuals augment their visible ethnicity by choosing a culture.  We assume they 
       
i \ j    C     D   
C  10-ci , 10-cj    1-ci , 8   
D    2 , 2   8 , 1-cj 
Table 1-B 
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have a binary choice of a visible trait .  After choosing , individuals are 
matched and the human interaction game commences.  Before, there were two types of 
matches that could occur.  Individuals could be matched with someone of their own 
ethnicity and cooperate costlessly, or be matched with someone of a different ethnicity 
and not cooperate due to uncertainty over the other's cost of cooperation.  With the 
pre-game choice there are four visibly distinct types an individual might be matched 
with, {M, A}, {F, A}, {M, J} and {T, J}, and in each case expectation over the cost of 
cooperation can be based on both  and . 
 In Basu (2005), individuals experience a cost to cooperate across ethnicity.  
This cost might be explained by historical conflict and prejudice.  If individuals of one 
cultural type benefit from cooperating across ethnicity, others might try to mimic that 
culture in the hope of benefiting from inter-ethnic cooperation.  This suggests an 
important way an individual is constrained in her choice of identity.  The larger the 
share of individuals choosing the ‘moderate’ or ‘cooperative’ culture the higher are 
their average costs to cooperating.  At some point it becomes irrational to believe that 
individuals choosing the cooperative culture will actually cooperate across ethnicity.  
Although there is freedom of choice in culture, how the culture will be perceived by 
others is out of the individual's control.   
 As modeled, implicit in creating a new identity to overcome inter-ethnic 
polarization is the creation of intra-ethnic hostility.  We assume this is the result of the 
same type of prejudice and stereotypes that impacts the cost of cooperating across 
ethnic types.  There are situations in which this assumption may be extreme, i.e. ethnic 
networks cross cultural lines, but in many other cases the assumption might be too 
weak, i.e. those of a different culture are seen as traitors who openly conspire with a 
foe and are thus hated more than those afflicted by nature to be the enemy.  To 
simplify the analysis we look at the case when the cost an individual has cooperating 
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with someone of a different culture is the same as the cost of cooperating with 
someone of a different ethnicity.  Thus, if two individuals,  and , are matched, the 
payoffs to their actions is given by Table 1-A if  and their payoffs are 
given by Table 1-B otherwise.   
 At this point it is helpful to clarify this paper's innovation in how social 
identity and peer-groups impact an individual's choice of culture.  Individuals are not 
born with a preference for a certain group or type of people.  They are born with an 
ethnicity and a cost for cooperating with anyone visibly, in culture or ethnicity, 
different.  By her choice of culture, the individual has some control of who she is and 
when and where these costs occur.  It should also be noted that for the cases 
considered, regardless of the meeting type both individuals cooperating Pareto 
dominated neither individual cooperating.  As a result, unlike Fryer and Jackson 
(2003) the models results are not driven by a choice between social prowess and 
productivity.  The model's results are driven by the individual's inability to separate 
the actions of one individual from those of the group.  Low cost individuals hope to 
choose a culture that is identified with a willingness to cooperate with those expected 
to cooperate. This hope is constrained by the actions of other individuals and the 
resulting beliefs individuals have on the distribution of cost in each culture. 
A Moderate Sub-Culture with No Dominant Ethnicity 
 In order for behavior strategies to constitute a Bayes-Nash equilibrium each 
individual must act in accordance with the best strategy given the strategy of the other 
individuals.  Let  and  be the 
possible matches in the interaction game.  A strategy  maps 
an action to each possible meeting.  In period 0 the individual chooses the culture and 
strategy that yields the highest expected payoff given the strategies of everyone else.  
As a result of the random matching framework of the model, incredible threats are not 
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possible, i.e. in equilibrium no individuals use dominated strategies and the set of 
Bayes-Nash equilibria is the set of sequential equilibria.  In deciding which culture to 
choose an individual only needs to compare the expected payoff of playing the highest 
paying strategy for an M to the expected payoff to the highest paying strategy for an F 
given the other players strategies.  In this sense, each individual chooses her optimal 
culture. 
 The particular focus is on pure strategy Bayes-Nash equilibrium in which 
individuals choosing M always cooperate with others choosing M.  If this is the case, 
in equilibrium, person i's expected payoff to choosing the moderate culture is 
decreasing in her idiosyncratic cost .  Since the moderate signal is not meaningful if 
everyone chooses to be moderate, then equilibrium with inter-ethnic cooperation must 
involve an interior solution.  Such an equilibrium involves a pair of 
thresholds , such that an individual  with cost less than her respective 
threshold. i.e., , best responds by choosing the moderate cultural trait and 
cooperating in meetings with other M's 
 Let Θ be the share of A in the community so that 1-Θ of the community is J.  
To keep the model as simple as possible we assume that the matching probabilities are 
determined by the population shares and are equal across ethnicities.  Let  be the 
fraction of individuals with ethnicity e that have idiosyncratic cost . 
ASSUMPTION 1   for  and  for  
 The costs are distributed uniformly across the population to simplify the 
analysis.  That  ensures there are extremist in the population, those that would 
benefit from aggressive play against cooperative players, but  ensures the (C, C) 
equilibrium Pareto dominates the (A, A) equilibrium in all matches. 
11 
 
PROPOSITION 1: Given Assumption 1, there is no pure strategy Bayes-Nash 
equilibrium where everyone with cost less than two, takes on the 'cooperative' culture, 
M, and in equilibrium best responds by cooperating across culture and ethnicity. 
PROOF:  The proposition considers the case where all non-extremist take to one 
culture.  This could happen in two ways.  If everyone, extremist or not, chooses the 
same culture then of course there is no cross culture cooperation.  In the second 
possibility society has one cooperative and one extremist culture.  It is clear that in 
inter-cultural meetings members of the extremist culture never cooperate.  Knowing 
this, individuals of neither group cooperate in inter-cultural meetings.  In neither case 
is their inter-ethnic and inter-cultural cooperation when all non extremist take the 
cooperative culture.▄ 
 Proposition 1 demonstrates that implicit in this model is that overcoming inter-
ethnic conflict requires the creation of intra-ethnic division.  In what follows we 
explore one type of equilibrium that demonstrates this tension. 
PROPOSITION 2: If , i.e., neither ethnicity has an overwhelming 
majority, there is a pure strategy Bayes-Nash equilibrium with across-ethnicity 
cooperation.  Individuals with ethnicity  and cost less than  will choose the cultural 
type .  Those that choose cultural type  will cooperate regardless of ethnicity.  
Individuals not choosing  will only cooperate with individuals of the same ethnicity 
and culture.  If  is the share of ethnicity choosing the modern culture, then 
i) , ii)  is increasing or decreasing in her ethnicity's share of the total 
population, and iii)  is decreasing in  and . 
PROOF:  In an equilibrium where moderates only cooperate with moderates, if person 
 has , she is willing to choose the moderate cultural trait if and only if 
   [1] 
 When , person  is willing to cooperate if and only if  
12 
 
  [2] 
At interior thresholds  and   equations [1] and [2] hold with strict 
inequality.  When the A's are best responding, the share choosing the moderate 
cultural trait is 
    [3] 
 and the inverse of the share of A choosing the moderate culture is 
    [4] 
 When the J's are best responding, the share choosing the moderate culture is 
     [5] 
 The inverse of the share of J's choosing the moderate culture is 
    [6] 
Equilibrium occurs at  such that 
.  Equations [1] and [2] imply part i) of the proposition.  As individual cost are 
strictly less than 8, i.e.  for  these equations are strictly positive for 
.  After noting that  and 
for  it is clear that if there is a  such that  
it is unique in the relevant range. Also note that and 
 while and , with 
 implies for equilibrium  
which implies  
To prove parts ii) and iii) note the equilibrium shares are and .  The envelope 
theorem gives 
    [7] 
and 
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     [8] 
 Parts ii) and iii) are direct implications of equation [7].  A graphical proof can be 
found in Gray (2009).▄ 
 The parameters of the model are such that mutual cooperation is always Pareto 
superior to mutual aggression.  Basu (2005) has demonstrated how the fear mongering 
and prejudice of a few extreme individuals can ignite hostilities between people.  
When the politicized trait divides the population evenly, the stereotypes are extremely 
difficult to overcome.  Inter-ethnic cooperation comes at the expense of division 
within each ethnic group.  Families are divided as individuals choose between a fear 
bread fundamentalism and modern way of life.   
 The model suggests that when there are hostilities between approximately 
equally sized ethnic groups, demographic changes have a dramatic impact on the type 
of cooperation between individuals of the competing populations.  As a group loses its 
power in numbers, a larger share of its members may choose the traditional culture, 
isolating themselves from both the other ethnic group and the now smaller share of 
individuals of their ethnicity that choose the modern culture.  As a result, individuals 
that choose the modern culture are more isolated from individuals of their own ethnic 
group.  Consider the impact the influx of freed slaves had on racial tension in northern 
cities in America in the late 19th century.  Wilson (1980) documents, "prior to 1900, 
one would rarely find a solidly black block, and a significant number of Negroes lived 
in white neighborhoods...White churches, which had allowed small numbers of blacks 
to participate in their services in the 1870s and 1880s, attempted to ease out black 
members altogether" (p. 64).  Wilson reports that it was during this same period that 
the black population in northern cities increased from 58.9% in Philadelphia to 
148.2% in Chicago.  In some cases competition in the labor market was sure to have 
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affected the hostility between the groups but the model suggest that the drastic 
changes in population shares would have been enough to disturb the harmony and 
have a noticeable impact on the equilibrium attitudes each groups individual's would 
share towards the others. 
 The third part of the proposition demonstrates a reason for optimism.  A 
decrease in the hostility one ethnicity has towards the other results in a higher share of 
both groups choosing the moderate culture.  In this equilibrium reducing the cost of 
cooperation is the first step to achieving higher levels of cooperation.  Further analysis 
in Gray (2009) shows that a decrease in the cost of one group increases the share of 
cooperators for both groups only if the economy is in a stable equilibrium.  Gray 
(2009) also shows that only when moderates ban cooperation with non fundamentalist 
of their own ethnicity can stability of equilibrium be guaranteed.  Gray (2009) also 
suggest a test for equilibrium stability that involves looking at the effect of a decrease 
in one groups cost on the equilibrium share of signalers. 
 Jibrin Ibrahim's (1991) study of religion and politics in Nigeria is illustrative of 
this type of equilibrium. He writes, "[Colonialism] has led to the evolution of political 
strains and conflicts between Nigerian proponents of the two rival universal religions 
that the Middle East has offered to the world" (Ibrahmi, 1991). With Muslims 
dominating the north and Christians the south, the country as a whole is divided 
almost evenly. Cooperation between members of the two groups is tenuous at best.  
Griswold (2008) wrote an article entitled "God's Country" published in the March 
2008 issue of The Atlantic that describes the start of the chaos that erupted after a 
Danish cartoon was published that was offensive to Islam. Many things happened but 
no one knew the individual perpetrators of the actions. A Muslim lawyer said, 
"Someone shouted arna-infidel.  Someone spat the word jihad...Someone picked up a 
stone" (Griswold, 2008). And so riots and killings ensued. Cooperation between 
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groups was forbidden. Christian girls were not to be seen with Muslim boys. 
Individuals suffered a penalty for trying to cooperate across groups. The article reports 
that as the killing increased two leaders of the fighting, an imam and a pastor, changed 
their message to one of moderation and cooperation. As they teamed up to preach a 
message of peace their former compatriots now describe them as sellouts. 
 In his treatise on the historical development of caste in India, Dirks (1980) 
provides additional anecdotal evidence that groups with decreasing hostility have 
increased willingness to cooperate across ethnic groups. In what began as a fight 
against Brahmin privilege Dirk notes the irony in "that the very upper-caste non-
Brahman groups who contested Brahman privilege were the ones who sought to keep 
the depressed classes in their ritual position of inferiority and subservience" (p. 241). 
The initial flair over contested privilege caused upper-caste non-Brahman's that had 
normally chosen our models M, to join the fight with the depressed Fs against the 
Brahman cause. 
Other Types of Cooperative Equilibrium 
 The above discussion has shown that inter-ethnic cooperation requires intra-
ethnic division and that one type of inter-ethnic cooperation is possible given no ethnic 
group has an overwhelming share of the total population.  The equilibrium described 
has moderates completely isolated from others in their ethnic group.  Fortunately, in 
the midst of conflict there are pockets, large and small, of inter-cultural and inter-
ethnic cooperation across the world.  It is this type of situation that is described in the 
next section.  Specifically, we explore an equilibrium in which one ethnicity is divided 
while the other ethnicity engages in cooperation across cultural types. 
 Consider an equilibrium where individuals of ethnicity A continue to play the 
strategy described in the previous section.  Thus, an A with <  are moderates and 
cooperate only with other moderates.  An A with  are fundamentalist and only 
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cooperate with another fundamentalist A.  Consider a strategy where the cultural 
norms of individuals of ethnicity J are different.  The moderates there engage in 
cooperation across ethnicity regardless of culture.  Thus a J with cost <  
chooses the moderate culture and engages in inter-cultural and inter-ethnic 
cooperation, i.e. they cooperate with other J's regardless of culture and A's that choose 
M.  An individual J with cost  chooses to be (weak) fundamentalist and 
cooperates in meetings with anyone from her ethnicity and does not cooperate 
otherwise.  Finally, an individual J with  chooses the fundamentalist culture and 
cooperate only in meetings with fundamentalist of her.  A's are best responding in 
their human interaction game as long as the cutoff cost is less than 2.  The constraints 
on J's are more complicated.  It is clear that moderates cooperating with moderates, 
fundamentalist cooperating with fundamentalist of the same ethnicity and 
fundamentalist with    cooperating with moderates of the same ethnicity are best 
responses given the above strategies.  For moderates to cooperate with fundamentalist 
of their own ethnicity they must have a high enough expectation of cooperation in 
return.  As individuals with   never best respond by cooperating across culture 
or ethnicity there need to be enough weak fundamentalist.  An immediate result is that 
for this strategy to be optimal in equilibrium there must be individuals that prefer 
cooperation with cooperators that nevertheless choose the 'non-cooperative' culture.  
An individual 's best response in a meeting with individual  is cooperation if and 
only if  where  is the probability  will cooperate.  If two J’s a moderate, i, who 
fully cooperates with a fundamentalist, j, the probability j will cooperate in return is 
.  Thus a J that chooses the moderate culture best responds by 
cooperating only if 2>  where is the threshold.  For equilibrium, 
equation [1] must equal zero at .  For J's to separate in equilibrium, an 
individual i with  must be indifferent between being an M and cooperating 
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with M's and F's of her own ethnicity and choosing F and only cooperating with F's of 
her own ethnicity.  If , this is true for J's when 
   [8] 
In equilibrium both equation [1] and [8] must equal zero.  Solving both 
equations for  gives 
     [9] 
    [10] 
Equilibrium requires 
   [11] 
A little algebra shows that equation [11] is a cubic equation in .  As a result there 
may be multiple real roots and the possibility of multiple equilibria.  For a 
characterization of equilibrium and their stability properties see Gray (2009).  There it 
is shown that when one ethnicity engages in inter-ethnic and intercultural cooperation 
while the other engages only in inter-ethnic cooperation, there is a stable equilibrium 
with low levels of cooperation and the possibility of an unstable equilibrium with high 
levels of cooperation.  The existence of an unstable equilibrium has important 
implications about the feasibility of reaching a cooperative equilibrium with both 
inter-ethnic and inter-cultural cooperation.  To ensure the unstable equilibrium does 
not exist, the ethnicity engaging in inter-cultural cooperation must have a low enough 
population share.  Figure 1-A demonstrates the possibility of multiple equilibrium 
when each population shares are equal so that  and .  The solid line 
represents equation [9] and the dashed equation [10].  In equilibrium X a higher share 
of A's and lower share of J's choose the 'moderate' culture than in equilibrium Y but in 
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both cases less A's choose the cooperative culture than when both ethnicities restrict 
inter-culture cooperation.  It is easy to show that much of the comparative static 
analysis, depends on the initial equilibrium, i.e. whether starting from X or Y. 
 For the purpose of comparison, a third type of equilibrium strategy is also 
worth discussing.  Consider an equilibrium in which both ethnicities engage in inter-
cultural cooperation.  Gray (2009) also discusses this example and provides a 
diagrammatic derivation of equilibrium properties including the possible existence of 
multiple unstable equilibrium.  Gray (2009) distinguishes stable, unstable and hyper-
unstable regimes that can occur when both ethnicities engage in inter-cultural 
cooperation.  Unstable regimes have the property that if individuals of a particular 
ethnicity over-shoot the equilibrium share of choosing M then all the individuals of the 
ethnicity will choose M causing equilibrium to breakdown.  A hyper-unstable regime 
has the property that either ethnicity might cause the equilibrium to breakdown due to 
overshooting.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Figure 1-A 
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Using the same parameters as before,  and , an equilibrium 
of this type results in a unique outcome of 28.9% of each ethnicity choosing the 
moderate culture.  If neither ethnicity cooperates across cultures then the outcome 
would involve 34.5% of each ethnicity choosing the moderate culture.  Both of these 
equilibrium result in less individuals in J benefiting from inter-ethnic cooperation and 
more A's benefiting from inter-ethnic cooperation than in the asymmetric case where 
60%-67% of those in J choosing moderation and cooperate across culture while 19%-
21% of those in A choosing moderation and are isolated from about 80% of her ethnic 
population.  Whether those that choose moderation are better off with inter-cultural 
cooperation or not is uncertain, but it is clear that if one ethnicity can restrict the other 
ethnic groups intra-ethnic relations, i.e. divide and conquer, while maintaining their 
cohesion enough to cooperate across cultures, they will make extreme gains at the 
other ethnicity's expense.  Beliefs of which type of equilibrium will fall outside the 
model but their importance in determining equilibrium well-being suggest how culture 
and inter-cultural relations are intrinsically political in nature. 
Conclusion 
 In highlighting an individual's choice of culture the model demonstrates the 
social constraints to that choice.  The result of those constraints is that in different 
social environments, two otherwise identical individuals may choose extremely 
different life paths.  The child soldier of Somalia may have been a doctor or lawyer 
given a different social environment.  In another place, the white supremist and black 
nationalist might be business partners, and the truant gang member could, in different 
circumstances, be an honors student. 
    Although there are many types of equilibria that have not been flushed out, the three 
cases presented demonstrate how beliefs influence the type of equilibrium a society 
reaches and is suggestive as to the types of support a cooperation building institution 
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might proffer.  Institutions that allow individual recognition would make it possible 
for stereotypes to be replaced with knowledge of the individual.  When individual 
accountability replaces discriminatory practices the payoff to choosing a moderate 
culture and cooperation in meetings should increase for all non-extremists in society.   
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Chapter 2  
The Impact of Small Firm's Attributes 
On the Choice to Apply and Application Outcomes 
Introduction 
 Since the availability of the Survey of Small Business Finances (SSBF) which 
includes information on the race and credit history of firm owners, there has been a 
number of studies that have explored differences in the borrowing experiences of 
firms across demographic groups.1
 In a review of all the papers cited on the Federal Reserve Bank website that 
test for discrimination using the SSBF data, none tested for, or allowed for the 
possibility of statistical discrimination.  If measures of quality differ in reliability 
across groups, or the mean or variance of quality differs across groups, then statistical 
discrimination implies that changes on the measure of quality will change expected 
quality differently across groups (Phelps, 1972; Aigner & Cain, 1977).  If there is 
statistical discrimination then a correctly specified model should interact race on all 
measures of quality.  Unless one makes strong assumptions on the groups being 
compared, a model that interacts race only with market concentration is mis-specified 
in the presence of statistical discrimination. 
  Cavalluzzo and Cavalluzzo (1998) suggested that 
including an interaction term of race and market concentration in a regression analysis 
was a good way to test for the presence of discrimination in credit markets.  This idea 
was inspired by Becker’s (1971) hypothesis that racial prejudice was less sustainable 
in highly competitive regions.  Their 1998 application made a big impact on future 
research.  The inclusion of the interaction term became standard practice in both linear 
and non-linear methods to test for discrimination in bank lending.   
                                                 
1 (Berger & Udell, 1995; Bernstein, 2002; Cavalluzzo & Cavalluzzo, 1998; Cavalluzzo, Cavalluzzo, & 
Wolken, 2002; Blanchflower, Levine, & Zimmerman, 2003; Coleman, 2002; 2003; 2005; Reese, 2007) 
not to mention others. 
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 Unless the authors of the previous work believe that taste based discrimination 
exist and statistical discrimination does not exist, their models are mis-specified.  In 
linear regressions omitted variables orthogonal to included ones do not prevent 
consistency of estimates; however in non-linear analysis the same is not true.  In logit 
and probit analysis omitted variables, even those orthogonal to the included 
independent variables, lead to inconsistent estimates (Greene, 2003, p. 673).  This 
paper attempts to provide consistent estimates of taste based discrimination by 
properly specifying a model of loan approval if statistical discrimination is a reality.   
 Including interaction terms for each variable is equivalent to estimating the two 
groups separately.  This is the approach taken here.  It has been noted however, that 
comparing the coefficients from non-linear models estimated with samples with 
unequal variances is problematic2
                                                 
2 The same problem of comparison arises for a dummy variable, or interaction term within a single 
model (Allison, 1999). 
 (Allison, 1999).  The solution to this problem is to 
compare average marginal effects (AME) instead of coefficients or odds ratios (Mood, 
2010).  Thus, although the regressions coefficients will be shown the main focus will 
be on the AME of the entire population, whites and Blacks together, from the white 
model versus the Black model.  For continuous variables the AME gives the average, 
across the total population, infinitesimal change to the probability of a loan being 
approved for an infinitesimal change of the variable, i.e. the average derivative.  For 
discrete variables the AME gives the average change in loan approval for the discrete 
change, i.e. the average impact.  If the AME differ across the Black and white models 
then race impacts the average benefit to the total population for a certain variable.  
With respect to Becker’s (1971) hypothesis, the model suggests taste based 
discrimination if on average, the total population benefits differently from a change to 
a competitive environment in predictions of the Black model.  
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 In addition to performing the standard probit analysis on the probability of 
approval, models that correct for sample selection and for heteroskadsticity in the error 
term are also included.  Although the standard probit and sample selection model had 
results consistent with intuition, the heteroskadsticity corrected model did not perform 
as well.  Even still, there were quite interesting results consistent across all three 
models.  In all models the AME for a competitive region is higher for the Black model 
to at least a 95% confidence level providing evidence that even after adjusting for 
selection bias and the impact of statistical discrimination, taste based discrimination 
has a negative impact on firms seeking credit.   
 There is little that Black-owned firms can do to counter taste based 
discrimination.  However, understanding the impact of statistical discrimination 
provides Black-owned firms useful tools to improving their access to credit.  Consider 
that across all three models there is a significant benefit to being a family owned firm 
and that benefit is significantly different across races.  Although not included in the 
final analysis, sc and ss-corporations were not significant in any of the analysis.  
Family owned may be significant because they in general do not benefit from 
bankruptcy protection.  In that case, banks would have an easier time recouping 
defunct loans via family assets.  Also, knowing the riskiness of a family business, 
business owners may take a more traditional approach, not overreaching in a way loan 
officers appreciate.  Whatever it is, the racial prejudice of others is significantly more 
difficult to change than one’s own actions.  An additional benefit to including a test 
for statistical discrimination is that it may provide insight to avenues of access to 
credit for Black-owned firms. 
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Prior Research 
 There is abundant evidence that Black-owned firms benefit from higher 
competitive areas than white-owned firms when the possibility of statistical 
discrimination is not controlled for and there is not a lack of data.  Cavalluzzo and 
Cavalluzzo (1998) cited a lack of Black firms in the 1998 survey as a cause of their 
inability to find evidence of discrimination in their study.  In Cavalluzzo, Cavalluzzo 
and Wolken (2002) they made adjustments to include the 1993 data and more than 
doubled the number of Black firms included in their analysis.  In that paper they found 
a significant difference between Black and white firms in the effect of being in a 
competitive region.   
 In a series of papers that examine the borrowing patters across demographic 
groups, Coleman (2002; 2003; 2005) finds evidence that Black-owned firms are less 
likely to apply for a loan due to fear of rejection but finds that interest rate differentials 
are small.  Somewhat contrary evidence is presented in Blanchflower, Levine and 
Zimmerman (2003) who find that while Black-owned firms are less likely to apply due 
to fear and that they are charged significantly higher interest rates after controlling for 
observables.   
 Two other related lines of research have to do with credit sources for small 
firms and differences across banks in allocating credit.  Cole and Wolken (1996) 
studied the sources of credit for small firms.  They found that banks are the primary 
source of credit for small firms.  This suggests that focusing on discrimination in loan 
approval by banks is most pertinent to small-firms.  Although banks are the focus of 
this paper, others have studied trade credit.  In particular, Coleman (2005) and Reese 
(2007) studied differences in access to trade credit across demographic groups.  Both 
find evidence of discrimination against Black-owned firms.  Cole, Goldberg and 
White (2004) find significant differences in lending patterns of banks of differences 
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sizes summarizing the differences as saying that bigger banks have more formal 
standards.  Their results motivate the interactions of formal standards with bank type 
in the analysis presented.   
 In total, there is a wide range of evidence that uses the Becker (1971) 
hypothesis to demonstrate disadvantages to access to Black-owned firms in accessing 
credit.  This paper adds to the evidence by presenting evidence that takes into account 
the possibility that banks statistically discriminate.  In doing so it provides 
asymptotically consistent evidence that demonstrates consistent estimates of the 
Becker effect, that are statistically significant, and stronger with sample selection. 
Empirical Framework and Description of the Data 
 Discrimination has been defined as, occurring “whenever the terms of a 
transaction are affected by personal characteristics of the participants that are not 
relevant to the transaction” (Blanchflower, Levine, & Zimmerman, 2003).  Although 
the definition is concise, it loses it precision in a world with statistical discrimination.  
When measures of quality vary with race does race become relevant to the 
transaction?  Is its use in the transaction no longer discrimination? 
 The framework taken here is to determine the impact changes in measures of 
quality have on approval rates for white and Black-owned firms separately.  This is the 
equivalent to estimating one model with interaction terms for race on every variable.  
Included in the model is also market concentration.   After estimating each model the 
AME is estimated for the total population.  Significantly different AME suggest 
statistical discrimination.  More importantly, in some cases they suggest where Black 
firms should focus their resources, i.e. improving credit ratings may on average be 
more beneficial for Black firms than it is for white firms.  In the spirit of Becker 
(1971) and Cavalluzzo and Cavalluzzo (1998) the finding of significantly different 
AME for market concentration is evidence of taste based discrimination.  To the 
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author’s knowledge there has never been a model of small-business financing that 
includes a test of statistical discrimination.  Thus, all previous test of discrimination 
suffer from omitted variable bias if statistical discrimination is a reality. 
 The national data from the 1998 and 2003 Survey’s of Small Business 
Finances (SSBF) are used to estimate the model.  The 1998 survey was conducted in 
1999 and 2000 for firms in business in 1998.  Information was collected for 3,561 
firms.  Information on the firm’s credit score, owner’s race, owner’s wealth, firm’s 
profit, sales, and a host of other potentially relevant information was included.  The 
2003 survey was conducted in 2004 and 2005 and has information for 4240 firms.   In 
both surveys Black-owned firms were over sampled but with the supplied weights the 
surveys were nationally representative of 5.3 and 6.3 million small businesses 
respectively.   
 The focus of this paper is on differences between Black and white-owned firms 
thus other minority firms were excluded.  There were 3844 white and 122 Black firms 
in 1998 and 2885 white firms and 274 Black firms in 2003.  In 1998 white firms 
applied 36% of the time compared to 34% for Black firm while this switched in 2003 
where only 24% of the white firms applied and 29% of the Black firms applied3
 This high difference in loan approval rates is not in itself evidence of 
discrimination as Black-owned firms were as a group less credit worthy than white 
owned-firms.  Table 2-A reports some differences in creditworthiness across race.  
Only 3% of white-owned firms had judgments against them as opposed to 9% of 
Black-owned firms.  Black-owned firms were less likely to have low risk credit 
.  
Although application rates were similar across races approval rates were drastically 
different.  Whites experienced approval rates of 88% and 78% in 1998 and 2003 
whereas Blacks experienced approval rates of 40% and 43%. 
                                                 
3 All percentages, means and medians are for sample weighted data. 
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ratings, 24% versus 29%, and no delinquencies, 67% versus 89%, while being three 
times more likely to have more than three delinquencies,18% versus 6%.   
 
Table 2-A 
Characteristics of firms in 1998 and 2003 SSBF 
 
Variable    White   Black 
 
N      6729   396 
 
1998 Firms    45%   47% 
 
No Owner Del    89%   67% 
 
Over 3 Owner Del   6%   18%   
   
No Firm Del    85%   79% 
 
Over 3 Firm Del   9%   12% 
 
No Judgments    97%   91% 
 
Low Risk Firm   29%   25% 
 
High Risk Firm   41%   44% 
 
Family Owned   49%   49% 
 
Global     4%   4% 
 
Used Commercial   73%   75% 
 
Competitive Area   5%   6% 
 
Loan for Business Capital  3%   1% 
Table 2-B reports that white owned firms have larger mean and median profit, 
sales, and assets than Black-owned firms.  This lack of wealth is important as it could 
be used as collateral for a business loan (Blanchflower, Levine, & Zimmerman, 2003).  
Also, white-owned firms are larger, with a median size of 5 or 7 employees depending 
on year compared to 3 employees for Black-owned firms.  White-owned firms are also  
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Table 2-B 
Mean and Median Firm Characteristics by Year and Race 
 
Year 1998 Variable
N     2885   274 
   White   Black 
 
Mean Profit in thousands  607.7   237.2 
(Median)    (32.5)   (13.1) 
 
Mean Sales in thousands  4,031.4  777.5 
(Median)    (302.0)  (75.2) 
 
Mean Assets in thousands  1,743.2  196.7 
(Median)    (122.2)  (29.5) 
 
Mean Employees   28.6   12.6 
(Median)    (5)   (3) 
 
Mean Owner Age   51.3   49.3 
(Median)    (51)   (49) 
 
Mean Firm Age   15.2   11.3 
(Median)    (12)   (9) 
 
Year 2003 Variable
N     3844   122 
   White   Black 
 
Mean Profit    613   254.9 
(Median)    (36.3)   (8.4) 
 
Mean Sales    4,754.5  1,071.6 
(Median)    (515.4)  (72.9) 
 
Mean Assets    2,424.2  455.4 
(Median)    (196.8)  (45) 
 
Mean Employees   32.5   19.1 
(Median)    (7)   (3) 
 
Mean Owner Age (Median)  53.2    51.7 
(Median)    (53)   (52) 
 
Mean Firm Age (Median)  16.8   12   
(Median)    (14)   (9)  
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older.  All of these characteristics may be factors in the overall difference in approval 
rates that must be controlled for.  They are also factors that suggest statistical 
discrimination might be a reality in the credit market.  As the distributions of measures 
of quality have drastically different distributions across the races they may impact a 
loan officers decision differently even if there is no taste for prejudice. 
Econometric Evidence 
Standard Probit 
 The evidence presented to this point has demonstrated that Black-owned firms 
are denied loans at higher rates than their white counterparts.  Additionally, the two 
groups have strikingly different characteristics.  It is plausible that a loan officer finds 
it rational to makes decisions of loan approval conditional on race even without a taste 
for race prejudice due to variations in the reliability of measures of quality.  To test for 
discrimination in non-linear models it is important to correctly specify the model to 
avoid inconsistency of estimators.  As such, a probit analysis of the probability of loan 
approval is done for Blacks and white owned firms separately.  Taking cues from the 
wealth of papers before the model estimated is 
Pr(app=1)=F[a + b1ind98 + b2no_own_de1 + b3no_firm_del +b4no_judgment + 
b5lowrisk + b6home_own  +b7educ +b8banktype +b9fam + b10global+ b11lnsales+ 
b12lnprofit+ b13lnliabilities+ b14lnassets+ b15lnloansiz+ b16siz1+ b17siz4+ b18-22ssic3-7+ 
b23hh1+ b24lnexper+ b25lnfirmage+ b26banktype*lnsales+ b27lnassets*lnliabilites+ b28 
no_own_de1*banktype+ b29female] 
 The two estimations provided very different results.  The coefficients from the 
two estimates are provided in Table 2-C. Having performed the analysis it is tempting 
to ask the question, “Would a Black-owned firm be better if he could disguise himself 
as white?”  Figure 2-A presents an answer to the question.   The horizontal-axis is a 
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Black-owned firm’s predicted probability given the probit with Black-owned firms.  
The y-axis is the firms predicted probability given the probit with white-owned firms.   
 
Table 2-C    
Standard Probit Coefficients 
White Only   Black Only 
appr         
-------------      
ind98    -0.3812978 **  1.620294 *** 
no firm del   0.3455906 *  -0.212099  
no own del   0.5696992 ***  0.2427412  
no judge   0.3339406   0.950536 ** 
low risk   0.1643365 *  -0.3479418  
own house   0.4685792 ***  0.3103189  
max ed GED   -0.1357829   -0.3726531  
not family owned  0.015116   -1.40092 ** 
comm bank   -1.300075 **  -3.291951  
global firm   -0.5137631 ***  -0.4625773  
log sales   -0.0258004   0.1222869  
log profit   0.0215129 **  0.0011785  
log liability   -0.1330909 ***  0.0058284  
log assets   -0.0415182   -0.0619081  
log loan size   -0.0957462 ***  -0.2020567 ** 
< than 10 workers  0.0202157   -0.019096  
> than 400 workers  0.0003439   0.7769728  
not competitive mkt  -0.5061807 **  -1.864574 ** 
owner experience  -0.0338337   -0.2046295  
log firm age   0.2349348 ***  0.0747843  
comm bank*firm sales 0.0834446 **  0.1312304  
log assets*log liability 0.0110742 ***  0.0076839  
no owner del* comm bank -0.0104544   1.618484 ** 
not female   -0.0853452   -0.2307684  
ssic industry codes      
Constant   1.830046 **  2.896378  
pseudo R-squared   0.1493    0.2869 
*** imply coefficient is significant at the .01 level, ** imply coefficient is significant 
at the .05 level and * imply coefficient is significant at the.1 level. 
There is a diagonal representing the 45degree line.  Any observation above the 
45degree line is better off with a disguise.  Note that this picture, though accurate in 
the sense that it reflects the results from the estimation, is only provocative as it gives 
individual effects not average effects.  It thus suffers from the problems of group 
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comparisons in non-linear models (Allison, 1999).  This is why, although coefficients 
are provided for all of the estimates, the focus will be on AME and the author suggests 
the reader focuses on the AME.  For an average comparison, note that if the cutoff for 
approval is a probability of success of 50%, then the Black model would estimate a 
53% approval.  The white model would estimate the same Black population as having 
an 87% approval rate.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 More important for the analysis is the AME implied by each model.  The AME 
for the standard probit is given in Table 2-D.  For a continuous variable, the AME 
gives the average change the variable has on the loan approval for an infinitesimal 
change.  For a discrete variable it gives the average change in the probability of loan 
approval.  Given that the AME is calculated for the total population, not the 
subpopulations white or Black, the AME are comparable. 
 In both models having no firm delinquencies, on average, increases the 
probability of loan approval, whereas the larger the size of the loan being applied for, 
the lower, on average, the probability of the loan being approved.  Additionally, not 
being in a competitive environment reduces the probability of a loan being approved.   
 
Figure 2-A 
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Table 2-D 
Average Marginal Effects of Full Population From Standard Probit Analysis 
 
 
  dy/dx Based on White Probit  dy/dx Based on Black Probit 
  
 
ind98   -0.0833703 **   0.3779365 *** +++ 
no firm del  0.0772184 ***   0.2656498 *** ++ 
no own del  0.1423543 ***   0.068318   
no judge  0.0792998    0.2633124 **  
low risk  0.0334082 *   -0.0969263  + 
own house  0.1142823 ***   0.0869264   
max ed GED  -0.0284938    -0.1033964   
not family owned 0.0031616    -0.3411595 *** +++ 
comm bank  -0.0547034 ***   -0.1044779   
global firm  -0.1286291 ***   -0.1296772   
log sales  0.0077595    0.0589661 * + 
log profit  0.0045025 **   0.0003249   
log liability  -0.0013591    0.0262829 *** ++ 
log assets  0.0157949 ***   0.0050911   
log loan size  -0.0200391 ***   -0.0557075 **  
< than 10 workers 0.0042568    -0.005262   
> than 400 workers 0.000072    0.1948548   
not competitive mkt -0.0858849 ***   -0.3761209 *** +++ 
owner experience -0.0070812    -0.0564168   
log firm age  0.0491703 ***   0.0206182   
not female  -0.0175421    -0.0631135   
*** imply AME is significant at the .01 level, ** imply AME is significant at the .05 
level and * imply AME is significant at the.1 level. 
 
+++ imply AME is significantly different across models at the .01 level, ** imply 
AME is significantly different across models at the .05 level and * imply AME is 
significantly different across models at the .1 level. 
In some cases measures of quality may serve as substitutes for the two groups.  An 
example is that no owner delinquency and having low risk have significant AME in 
the white analysis whereas in the Black analysis having no judgments on average 
significantly increases the probability of loan approval.  An interesting result that will 
be found in all of the models presented is the AME of having a family business in the 
Black analysis.  Although there is no effect from the white analysis, there is a 
35 
 
substantial, 34%, increase on average in having a loan approved for family businesses 
according to the Black analysis.  Although corporations were not included in the final 
analysis it should be noted that the inclusion of ss and sc type corporations did not 
change the result and were not significant.   
 Another result is related to Cole, Goldberg and White's (2004) work on bank 
size.  The AME from the white analysis finds that on average commercial banks are 
5% less likely to approve a loan than non-commercial banks.  Although the AME are 
not significant in the Black analysis it is still evidence that commercial banks have 
higher standards than their counter-parts. 
 The other AME from the white analysis are fairly intuitive.  Positive measures 
of credit on average increase the likelihood of a loan being approved.  Owning a 
house, having high profits, and having low liabilities, all on average, increase the 
probability of a loan being approved.  Additionally, on average the larger the loan 
applied for the lower the probability the loan will be approved.   
 The AME from the Black analysis had less significant variables although the 
pseudo R-squared from the Black probit was higher, this could have been related to 
the lower sample size from which the regression was based.  On average, not having 
judgments is very significant to effecting loan approval rates, being family owned, 
sales, liabilities and the Herfindahl index were the primary variables effecting loan 
approval. 
 Wald tests for significance between the AME resulting from the two models 
suggests there is a significant difference in the impact of have no firm delinquency, 
low risk, a family owned business, sales and liabilities, as well as the year.  More 
importantly for a test of taste based discrimination the model finds that although both 
models predict significant AME due to changes in competitiveness, the Wald test finds 
they are significantly different.  The Black based probit predicts a larger change in 
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loan approval when moving out of a competitive region.  Thus after controlling for all 
twenty seven characteristics and allowing for statistical discrimination, there is still 
strong evidence that Black owned firms face taste based discrimination.   
 As it may be pointless to rid the world of taste based of taste based 
discrimination an additional lesson to Black-owned firms may be to reduce their firm 
delinquencies, and increase their sales as the analysis suggest it is more helpful for 
them than their white counterparts. 
Probit w/ Sample Selection 
 Many researchers have noted that bank applicants are a self-selected group (see 
for example Blanchflower, Levine, and Zimmerman (2003) and Cole, Goldberg, and 
White).  The presumption is that only firm owners that believe they have a high 
chance of receiving a loan would bother to apply.  If the self-selection mechanism is 
symmetric across race then measures of discrimination would be unaffected by the 
process.  However, if for example, Blacks-owned firms use unobservable information 
that makes them more cautious in applying for loans, then a model of loan approval 
that does not include these unobservables would underestimate race bias. 
 The 1998 and 2003 SSBF collected data on why firms that wanted credit may 
not have applied for credit.  This information seems like the Holy Grail for researchers 
looking for a way to identify selection issues in loan applications that varied across 
race.  An example comes from Blanchflower, Levine, and Zimmerman (2003) who 
use the new data to test if Black-owned firms are less likely to apply for a loan due to 
fear of rejection.  They find that Black-owned firms do self-select out of the applicant 
pool due to fear of rejection more than white firms.  Cavalluzzo, Cavalluzzo, and 
Wolken (2002) perform similar test and find similar results.  They however go further 
by performing a simultaneous equation analysis on fear of rejection and approval rates 
as a way to estimate for sample selection.  The problem with this line of inquiry and 
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the use of fear of rejection to correct for sample selection is the strong correlation of 
fear of rejection with the loan approval.  To correct for sample selection a proxy for 
applying is needed that is not strongly related to the approval process (Greene, 2003, 
p. 86).  The basic problem of sample selection is that there is unobservable 
information but since fear is highly correlated to approval, an observable, fear is not 
providing additional information.  The point is that people with fear of applying 
typically do so because of other observable measures of quality.  The fact that Black-
owned firms have higher fear is suggestive that they recognize that higher standards 
Table 2-E 
Fear vs #of Institutions and Owner Age 
 
 White  Number of obs =    6669 R-squared     =  0.1636 
Apply=.3963418   -.139035*lnonage+ .4210136*lnninst  
 
Number of obs =    6729 R-squared     =  0.0103 
Apply=.2821189   +.1186583*fear  
 
Black  Number of obs =     396 R-squared     =  0.1376                            
Apply = 1.221587-.3161339 * lnonage+.3191717*lnninst  
 
Number of obs =     396          R-squared     =  0.0653 
Apply = .1939754 +.2383943*fear 
 
White  Number of obs =    2555 R-squared     =  0.0220 
Approve= .1466223+.207133* lnonage-.0839415*lnninst   
 
Number of obs =    2599  R-squared     =  0.1788 
Approve= .9315061-.3552661* fear 
 
Black  Number of obs =     132 R-squared     =  0.0199 
Approve=-.131576 +.0938922*lnonage +  .1403639*lnninst 
  
  Number of obs =     132 R-squared     =  0.2573 
  Approve.8036183   -.5506695*fear 
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exist in the credit market.  Nevertheless, the high correlation between approval rates 
and fear and the small correlation between fear and applying make fear of applying a 
bad variable for a model of sample selection.   
 Although fear of approval does not meet the standard of a good instrument for 
a sample selection model two other variables do.  The number of institutions a firm is 
associated with and the firm’s owner’s age are highly correlated with a firm’s decision 
to apply.  The regressions results can be found in Table 2-E.  Fear of applying had a 
R-squared of between .01 and .07 when explaining application decisions while number 
of institutions and owner age have R-squares ranging between .13 and .16.  On the 
other hand, owner fear is highly correlated with rejection, suggesting owners have 
reasons to fear whereas the number of institutions and its owner’s age are not a cause 
of concern. Younger owners are more likely to apply and the more institutions a firm 
is associated with the more likely it is to apply even after controlling for the other firm 
characteristics.  Neither of these variables, even when significant, provides much 
explanation to why firms are approved or denied loan applications.  Thus, together 
they provide a mechanism to test for sample selection. 
 Using these two variables sample selection is modeled as follows, 
y1=0   Pr(y1=0)= Ф(-x1β1) 
y1=1, y2=0  Pr(y1=1,y2=0)= Ф(x1β1)- Ф(x1β1, x2β2,ρ) 
y1=1, y2=1  Pr(y1=1,y2=1)= Ф(x1β1, x2β,ρ) 
 
E[ε1| x1, x2]= E[ε2| x1, x2]=0,  
Var[ε1| x1, x2]= Var[ε2| x1, x2]=1,  
Cov [ε1,ε2| x1, x2]= ρ 
The vector for the application decision, x1, includes everything except those connected 
with loan size and bank type while adding owner age and the number of institutions 
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associated with a firm.  The vector x2 is the same as in the first probit analysis.  The 
point estimates suggest that white-owned firms are responsive in their application 
decisions to the included variables.  Those without delinquencies or judgments are less 
likely to apply for credit.  Also those with education and large firms are less likely to 
apply for credit.  The model suggests the young white owners are significantly more 
likely to apply for credit while the same is not true for Black owners.  For Black firms 
however, the probability to apply does significantly decrease with firm age.   
The AME from the white probit with sample selection given in Table 2-F are 
not strikingly different from the standard probit.  The AME of females is still 
insignificant and the impact of being in a competitive region is now only significant at 
the 90% level.  Now the AME from assets and liabilities are significant.  The signs of 
all AME are intuitive.  Better measures of credit, assets and sales/profits all improve 
the probability a loan will be accepted.  Commercial banks still exhibit higher 
standards. 
Table 2-G gives the AME from the Black probit with sample selection.  The 
model is consistent with the standard probit presented earlier.  The AME for no firm 
delinquencies and no judgments are significant although low credit rating is still 
insignificant.  Being a family business increases loan approval probability on average 
by 34%.  The AME on sales and liabilities have the expected sign.  What might be 
most interesting for the discussion of discrimination is that the sample selection model 
predicts an AME 5% higher for changes in market competitiveness.  This suggests that 
not accounting for sample selection did understate the effect of discrimination. 
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Table 2-F 
Probit model with sample selection (Whites Only) 
    Coef.    Coef.  
appr              apply           
ind98    -0.4828118 ***  -0.4665531 *** 
no firm del   0.1816301   -0.1184418 * 
no own del   0.4447266 ***  -0.0257476  
no judge   0.1628723   -0.3182001 ** 
low risk   0.1612957 **  0.0461607  
own house   0.4377248 ***  0.0743573  
max ed GED   -0.0688219   0.0871899 * 
not family owned  0.0299546   0.1570861  
comm bank   -1.193938 ***    
global firm   -0.4877181 ***  -0.1412013  
log sales   0.0054727   0.029398 * 
log profit   0.0179272 **  -0.0037245  
log liability   -0.0793497   0.0316545  
log assets   -0.0384962   -0.0151775  
log loan size   -0.0776944 **    
< than 10 workers  0.0297697   -0.0071366  
> than 400 workers  -0.157007   -0.2706279 ** 
not competitve mkt  -0.3568173 *  0.1704396 * 
owner experience  -0.0824513   -0.0335178  
log firmage   0.1930321 ***  0.0093123  
comm bank*firm sales 0.073468 **    
log assets*log liability 0.0109224 ***  0.0033941  
no owner del*comm bank 0.0034847     
not female   -0.0314967   0.0416071  
SSIC Code 
Constant 0.3397761   log # inst 0.9667311 *** 
      log owner age -0.5241604 *** 
      Constant -0.1257977   
   /athrho | 0.8088122 rho | 0.6689345  
Wald test of indep. eqns. (rho = 0): chi2(1) =    24.19   Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 
 
*** imply coefficient is significant at the .01 level, ** imply coefficient is significant 
at the .05 level and * imply coefficient is significant at the .1 level. 
 Holding all these factors constant, Table 2-H shows that the models with 
sample selection finds a significant difference between the impact of being in a 
competitive region.  Thus even when statistical discrimination is accounted for the 
AME across models suggest taste based discrimination is an issue for Black-owned 
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firms.  Further incorporating selection bias increases the evidence of taste based 
prejudice. 
 
Table 2-G 
Probit model with sample selection (Blacks Only) 
    Coef.   Coef. 
appr               Apply  
ind98    1.61439 ***  -0.3314949 
no firm del   -0.3673536   0.0299089 
no own del   0.260039   -0.0963104 
no judge   0.7826499 *  -0.2279043 
low risk   -0.3302871   0.0844349 
own house   0.2581799   0.0740478 
max ed GED   -0.3490963   0.2148995 
not family owned  -1.442326 **  0.0808877 
comm bank   -3.651755 *  - 
global firm   -0.387683   0.1284177 
log sales   0.1204878   0.0289233 
log profit   -0.0050614   -0.0104027 
log liability   0.0212245   0.0188061 
log assets   -0.0563037   0.0129437 
log loan size   -0.1977025 **  - 
< than 10 workers  0.0121866   0.0738981 
> than 400 workers  0.8285711   0.6643673 
not competitive mkt  -1.782041 ***  0.3064434  
owner experience  -0.2397649   -0.0508969  
log firmage   -0.0072464   -0.2508322 ** 
comm bank*firm sales 0.1622953     
log assets*log liability 0.0074279   0.0005458  
no owner del*comm bank 1.628855 ***    
not female   -0.1052491   0.0844058  
SSIC Code 
Constant   2.430285     
      log # instit 1.093348 *** 
      log owner age -0.7104433  
      Constant -0.1163215 \ 
/athrho | 0.5099991  
rho |  0.4699445 
Wald test of indep. eqns. (rho = 0):  chi2(1) =     1.47   Prob > chi2 = 0.2252  
 
*** imply coefficient is significant at the .01 level, ** imply coefficient is significant 
at the .05 level and * imply coefficient is significant at the.1 level. 
The AME from the white probit with sample selection given in  
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Table 2-H 
Average Marginal Effects of Full Population 
 
  dy/dx Based on White   dy/dx Based on Black 
   
  Sample Selection Probit   Sample Selection Probit
   
        
 
ind98   -0.1647758 ***   0.3929958 *** +++ 
no firm del  0.0618027 *   0.1971002 **  
no own del  0.1539821 ***   0.0724932   
no judge  0.0547308    0.2023962 *  
low risk  0.052669 **   -0.0920349  ++ 
own house  0.1507282 ***   0.0715404   
max ed GED  -0.022694    -0.0985142   
not family owned 0.0098362    -0.3400196 *** +++ 
comm bank  -0.0877471 ***   -0.0772671   
global firm  -0.1667008 ***   -0.1054889   
log sales  0.0194245 **   0.0651252 **  
log profit  0.005904 **   -0.001419   
log liability  0.0156333 ***   0.030551 ***  
log assets  0.0247823 ***   0.0068553   
log loan size  -0.0255871 ***   -0.0554261 **  
< than 10 workers 0.0098209    0.0034132   
> than 400 workers -0.0525963    0.2299245   
not competitive mkt -0.1113514 *   -0.4401842 *** +++ 
owner experience -0.0271537    -0.0672183   
log firm age  0.0635713 ***   -0.0020315   
not female  -0.0103495    -0.0295543   
 
*** imply AME is significant at the .01 level, ** imply AME is significant at the .05 
level and * imply AME is significant at the.1 level. 
 
+++ imply AME is significantly different across models at the .01 level, ** imply 
AME is significantly different across models at the .05 level and * imply AME is 
significantly different across models at the .1 level.  
Heteroscedasticity adjusted Probit  
 As a final specification test a model that allows for heteroscedasticity in the 
error term is presented.  It is hypothesized that the heteroscedasticity is due to changes 
in bank decision making for firms with different levels of firm profits.  The variance 
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of profit is extremely high amongst firms.  If banks have a different set of rules for 
those few firms with very high profits than the model estimates will be inconsistent 
unless the variance of the error term is allowed to incorporate profit.  Here the 
variance equation is specified as, 
Var[εi ] = exp(γ1profit + γ2 profit * profit )  
Profit was included as a quadratic primarily because it produced a better fit than only 
including the single profit measure.  Everything else is the same as the original probit 
model.  In none of the test did heteroscedasticity seem to be important to the white 
analysis but it seemed very important to the Black analysis.  This could be due to the 
prevalence of young firms and firms with poor credit.  Both types of firms would be 
types that might meet exemptions from certain conditions for loan approval given high 
enough profits.   
The results from the heteroscedasticity models, Table 2-I, left something to be 
desired.  The variance equations for the white probit found neither profit coefficient to 
be significant indicating that it was mis-specified.  The predicted signs and 
significance of the AME were not however impacted (see Table 2-J).  Measures 
indicating creditworthiness, with the exception of judgments, assets, sales and profits 
all significantly increased average loan approval.  Commercial banks on average were 
less likely to approve a loan and the larger the loan applied for the larger on average 
the chance of approval. 
 The Black model is a different story.  Both coefficients on profit were highly 
significant in the variance equation indicating an allowance for heteroscedasticity in 
the error term was correct.  However, many of the implied AME resulting from the 
Black heteroscedasticity adjusted model were counterintuitive.  Consider that owner 
experience, having a low risk firm, home ownership and profit, all showed up as on 
average significantly reducing loan approval.  It is possible that the correlation 
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amongst other variables in the model caused the counterintuitive result but at this point 
it is difficult to determine.   
Table 2-I 
White Only HetProbit  Black Only HetProbit 
    Coefficents   Coefficents 
appr         |    
ind98    -0.4156064 **  5.864902 
no firm del   0.3573229 *  0.0169163 
no own del   0.5939274 ***  0.1230347 
no judge   0.3377338   0.3131139 
low risk   0.1762948   -0.1036879 
own house   0.4885683 ***  -0.0921066 
max ed GED   -0.139744   -0.0648079 
not family owned  0.0205125   -5.943003 
comm bank   -1.393331 **  -0.0144346 
global firm   -0.5263515 ***  -0.0680068 
log sales   -0.0326337   0.0897957  
log profit   0.0266579   0.0214726  
log liability   -0.135433 ***  -0.0462265 * 
log assets   -0.0391618   -0.0357966 * 
log loan size   -0.1010986 **  -0.0237004  
< than 10 workers  0.0344752   0.0052707  
> than 400 workers  -0.0218717   -0.2232929  
not competitive mkt  -0.5506282 **  -0.4386814 * 
owner experience  -0.0380836   -0.105954  
log firm age   0.2556913 ***  0.067462  
comm bank*firm sales 0.0886554 **  -0.022712  
log assets*log liability 0.0109559 **  0.0062062 * 
no owner del*comm bank -0.0053938   0.280308  
not female   -0.099143   -0.2427213 * 
SSIC Codes 
Constant   1.99065 **  0.0492068  
-------------+- -----------  ------------  
lnsigma2     |     
log profit   0.0438896   -1.306784 *** 
|     
log profit*log profit  -0.0033045   0.1069073 *** 
--------------- -----------  ------------  
Wald test of lnsigma2=0:                 Wald test of lnsigma2=0:             
  
chi2(2) =     1.25   Prob > chi2 = 0.5346   chi2(2) =    18.68   Prob > 
chi2 = 0.0001 
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Without determining the cause of these results, likely correlation amongst the 
independent variables, drawing inferences from this model lacks credibility. 
Table 2-J 
Average Marginal Effects of Full Population 
 
  dy/dx Based on White Het Probit dy/dx Based on Black HetProbit 
   Coef.     Coef.    
ind98   -0.0858515 **   0.4162528 *** 
 +++ 
no firm del  0.076003 ***   0.1591718 *** 
  
no own del  0.1396104 ***   0.090803 * 
  
no judge  0.0752097    0.2213778 *** 
  
low risk  0.0337777 *   -0.0759648 * ++ 
own house  0.1121305 ***   -0.0585813 ** +++ 
max ed GED  -0.0276532    -0.044277   
not family owned 0.0040438    -0.5642583 *** +++ 
comm bank  -0.0561171 ***   -0.0479386 *  
global firm  -0.1236049 **   -0.045674   
log sales  0.0067747    0.0492255 *** ++ 
log profit  0.0075816 **   -0.0368778 *** +++ 
log liability  -0.0019689    0.0142492 *** ++ 
log assets  0.015207 **   0.0140878 *  
log loan size  -0.0199475 ***   -0.0157343   
< than 10 workers 0.0068679    0.0034989 
> than 400 workers -0.0043519    -0.1569913   
not competitve mkt -0.0875134 ***   -0.1906506 *** ++ 
owner experience -0.0075142    -0.070341 ** + 
log firmage  0.0504498 ***   0.0447868 **  
not female  -0.0191737    -0.1499887 *** +++ 
*** imply AME is significant at the .01 level, ** imply AME is significant at the .05 
level and * imply AME is significant at the.1 level. 
 
+++ imply AME is significantly different across models at the .01 level, ** imply 
AME is significantly different across models at the .05 level and * imply AME is 
significantly different across models at the .1 level. 
All is not lost however because heteroskedasticity in the errors has not been a 
focus of the discussion in determining whether there is discrimination in credit 
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markets. Although the model presented here is clearly mis-specified the variance 
equation for Black probit is significant suggesting heteroskedasticity is an issue that 
should be perused.  In order to do this it is necessary to reduce correlation amongst the 
number of independent variables invariably focusing on which are most important in 
explaining the loan approval decision. 
Conclusion 
 This paper has built on previous work on discrimination in small business 
access to credit by incorporating the possibility of statistical discrimination in its 
estimation framework.  In addition, it presented a model that compensated for 
selection bias in the loan decision process.  The findings are significant.  Even after 
accounting for statistical discrimination evidence of taste based discrimination still 
exist.  Further, when selection bias is accounted for the evidence of taste based 
discrimination is even stronger. 
 Previous research presented asymptotically inconsistent estimates of the 
impact of discrimination because of omitted variable bias.  If there is statistical 
discrimination as well as taste based discrimination then all measures of quality should 
be interacted with race.  This is the first paper to do so when attempting to measure 
discrimination in small business access to credit.  In order to make across group 
comparisons it is necessary to compare AME (Allison, 1999; Mood, 2010).  Even still, 
there are strong effects that increase when sample selection is accounted for. 
 In addition to providing consistent estimates of discrimination incorporating 
statistical discrimination gives Black-owned firms insight into mechanisms to improve 
their probability of loan approval.  One result that came out across models was that 
family owned firms on average have a higher loan approval rate for Blacks (see  
Table 2-K).  This could be related to lack of bankruptcy protection that gives banks an 
additional layer of security in providing loans.  Also, the models made it clear the 
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importance of not having judgments or firm delinquencies for having a loan approved.  
Instead of focusing on the prejudice of others, Black-owned firms may do better by 
focusing on ways to increase their loan approval probabilities.  This analysis provides 
them that insight. 
Table 2-K 
Comparison Across Specifications 
 
   Probit   HetProbit  Sample Selection 
ind98   +++   +++    +++ 
no firm del  ++   
no own del    
no judge    
low risk  +   ++    ++ 
own house     +++  
max ed GED    
not family owned +++   +++    +++ 
comm bank    
global firm    
log sales  +   ++  
log profit     +++  
log liability  ++   ++  
log assets    
log loan size    
not competitive mkt +++   ++    +++ 
owner experience    +  
log firmage    
not female     +++  
+++ imply AME is significantly different across models at the .01 level, ** imply 
AME is significantly different across models at the .05 level and * imply AME is 
significantly different across models at the .1 level. 
 An important avenue for future idea is to account for unobserved heterogeneity 
in the error term.  There is evidence that the variance of the Black probit is a function 
of firm profit however doing so creates counterintuitive AME in the model.  This is 
possibly the result of correlated independent variables.  The variance in the white error 
did not follow the same pattern.  Sorting out this unobserved heterogeneity would 
allow for better estimates of discrimination. 
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Chapter 34
Literacy Traps: 
 
Societal Education and the Skill Premium 
Introduction 
    The idea that an economy or a group of people can get caught in a low-level trap 
from which it is, in principle, possible to escape but no individual has it within his or 
her power to break out of it is an old one in economics, but its importance has 
remained undiminished. Among Tapan Mitra's many fields of enquiry in economic 
theory, poverty traps has been a significant one. In 1995, in a joint paper with Mukul 
Majumdar, for instance, he explores the relation between increasing returns and 
poverty traps and how an economy can be caught in poverty, though once it is 
wrenched out of the trap it can grow unassisted (Majumdar and Mitra, 1995; see also 
Majumdar and Mitra, 1982; Dechert and Nishimura, 1983). This work is a natural 
extension of the idea of vicious circle of poverty to be found in Nurkse (1953) and 
Rosenstein-Rodan (1943) and also the idea that there is a close connection between 
underdevelopment and multiple equilibria (Basu, 1997). 
    While the dominant discussion of low-level traps has occurred in the context of a 
nation's or a collectivity's income, it is possible to carry the broad idea over to other 
indicators of a nation's well-being (see Hoff and Stiglitz, 2001). In the present paper, 
we try to show that something similar may happen regarding literacy. A nation can get 
caught in a low-literacy or low-education trap. Once caught in this situation, it is not in 
the interest of any individual to incur cost and acquire a lot of skills. It is the skill-
lessness of others that makes it not worthwhile for each individual to acquire much 
skills, and thus they are all trapped in a vicious circle. 
                                                 
4 This chapter was jointly written with Atal, V., Basu, K. and Lee, T. 
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    Our analysis has important policy implications. A nation caught in a low-literacy 
trap cannot break out of it just by providing schools for it is not the supply of schools 
that is a bottleneck but the demand for higher education. Hence, the rather abstract 
model that we are about to construct can shed light on significant policy questions 
such as when do we need to make education compulsory and when will the simple act 
of making schools available take care of the problem of under-investment in human 
capital. The model sheds interesting light on how, in a certain class of equilibria, 
giving a subsidy to education may have no effect on promoting education. In the 
process we get some insights into the design of policy that will be effective. 
    The core of our model is based on the idea of an O-ring production function, 
introduced in the literature by Kremer (1993) -- see also Kremer and Maskin (1996). 
The idea is this. Since so much of today's work takes the form of the assembly line, 
either literally, as in the manufacture of cars, or, in effect, as in software services, 
where small groups are engaged in doing different parts of a large job, that a 
malfunction in one part can undo the benefits of the other tasks that are done well. The 
metaphor is that of the space shuttle Challenger disaster in 1986, which was caused by 
the malfunctioning of a tiny component of the space-ship, the O-ring. The idea that 
there will be this kind of spillover effects of education among workers seems natural 
enough and there has been a lot of empirical and theoretical work on this (Rauch, 
1993; Benabou, 1993; Redding, 1996; Acemoglu and Angrist, 2000; Kremer, Miguel 
and Thornton, 2004; Moretti, 2004). 
    In Kremer's O-ring model, the skill that workers bring to their task is innate to the 
worker. If, however, we introduce education in the model, whereby each worker has 
the choice of incurring some cost (in terms of both time and money) and improving 
their skills and ability to do their jobs better, then interesting equilibria arise, including 
the possibility that workers will get caught in a low-education trap. This is the central 
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idea that is pursued in this paper and while poverty traps are a pervasive topic in 
economics, low-literacy traps seem to have received much less attention. The work 
most related to our paper is that by Jones (2008). He constructs a random matching 
model in which there is endogenous human capital accumulation. Each individual 
faces the choice to be trained as a generalist or a specialist, with the value of being a 
specialist increasing as the density of specialists in the population rise.  In Jones' 
model, for certain parameter values, there is the possibility of multiple equilibria since 
the economy could be one of specialists or generalists. Another related exercise (Basu 
and Weibull, 2003; Horowitz, 2008) studies the punctuality traits of a collectivity, 
where each person benefits from other people's punctuality and also the marginal 
return to increased individual punctuality rises with the level of other people's 
punctuality. This strategic complementarity easily leads to multiple equilibria, 
whereby two societies of a priori identical individuals can get caught in, respectively, 
a tardy and a punctual equilibrium.   
 Model 
A Primer on O-Rings 
    It is useful to begin by briefly summarizing the O-ring model, while at the same 
time adapting it a little to our present need. There is one consumer good in the 
economy. Its production takes place in factory units or, simply, factories. Each firm 
can own one or more factories. In each factory n tasks (n≥2) are  done, each task being 
done by one worker. Denote a worker's skill by q where 0≤q≤1. We can interpret q as 
the probability that the worker finishes his or her task successfully. Let qi be the skill-
level that goes into task i, that is, the worker employed on task i has a skill level qi and 
let B be the output produced per worker in a factory when all tasks are performed 
successfully. The ‘production function' in which x denotes the expected output is as 
follows: 
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      [1] 
 
    It is easy to see that if all tasks are performed at skill level 1, then total output from 
the factory will be nB and so the per worker output is B. 
    To start with, let us take the skill levels of workers to be exogenously given. The 
decision-making by the firms can be modeled in two different ways. The traditional 
route is to assume that there are many price-taking firms and free entry. Since there is 
a continuum of worker types, there is a continuum of wages, one for each type of 
worker. Let w(q) be the market wage schedule exogenously given to the firms. We 
will throughout take the price of the product to be one. In this case the firm's problem 
is to choose n workers for operating a factory so as to maximize its profit. Hence, the 
firm's problem is the following: 
 
 
This gives us the following first-order condition for each task i: 
     [2] 
In addition, Kremer (1993) proved that it is always in the firm's interest to have 
all its tasks done by workers of the same skill level. This is called the "skill-clustering 
theorem" in Basu (1997), where a short proof is available. 
Theorem 1 (Skill-Clustering)  If  maximize a firm's profit, then (in addition 
to equation [2])  
In light of the skill-clustering theorem, equation [2] can be written as 
 
, 
where q is the skill of labor chosen for each task by a firm. 
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Since, in equilibrium, each firm earns zero profit, a firm employing workers of 
skill q must satisfy 
 
or,       [3] 
Hence, we know that in equilibrium the wage schedule for different worker 
qualities will be given by this equation. 
    An alternative approach, which however will not be pursued here, is to assume that 
there are two or more firms and these are Bertrand oligopsonists. Each firm announces 
the wage it is willing to pay for each type of worker, and workers go to the firm 
offering the highest wage, ties being broken arbitrarily. The `equilibrium' of this 
oligopsony is simply the Nash equilibrium of the normal-form game among the firms. 
As we know from standard oligopsony, in equilibrium each firm will earn zero profit. 
The logic of this is obvious. If there is a firm that earns positive profit, then another 
firm could offer its workers a slightly higher wage and woe them away. So the initial 
outcome would not have been a Nash equilibrium. If, in addition, we assume away the 
integer problem, that is, assume that, for each wage announced by the firm, either no 
worker will agree to work or any number of workers will, then the wage schedule in 
equilibrium will be exactly as shown by the above equation [3] 
We shall however go with the traditional approach of taking this to be a model 
of perfectly competitive firms with free entry. 
Endogenizing Level of Education 
Let us now allow for the possibility that individuals do not come with an 
immutable skill level but can acquire skill through education. To make it possible to 
conduct a formal analysis, we have to take a slightly novel route in developing the 
idea of an equilibrium. We shall assume that there are two-periods. In the first, 
workers choose their level of education and in the second period, with education as 
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given, firms make their decisions as in a standard competitive model with free entry, 
in other words, exactly as described in the above section. In the first period, the 
workers essentially do a Nash-type calculation. That is, each worker calculates what 
would happen if he or she deviated and chose some other level of education. If she 
could not do better by any such deviation, then the existing choice of education for all 
workers is an `equilibrium'. 
Formally, in the first period, each worker chooses to obtain a certain level of 
skill q through education. We will assume that the cost of education that provides the 
level of skill q is given by c(q) with c′(q)≥0. In the second period, the firms take their 
decisions about what kinds of workers to hire for the different tasks, with wages being 
treated as exogenous by each firm. The second period equilibrium is reached when we 
find a wage schedule (that is, a wage of each level of skill) such that each firm 
maximizes profits and earns zero. In other words, the second period works as 
described in the previous section.  After the second period, firms earn their payoffs 
(we already know this will be zero in equilibrium) and each worker receives his or her 
payoff, which is equal to the wage earned by the worker minus the cost of education. 
    In defining the equilibrium formally in this two-period model, let us focus on a 
refinement of what was described informally above. The refinement is an outcome in 
which all workers voluntarily choose the same level of skill. We shall call this the 
`symmetric equilibrium', with the frequent indulgence of dropping the epithet 
`symmetric', since we are not going to talk about a non-symmetric equilibrium in this 
paper. 
    A skill level q and a wage equal to qⁿB for each of these workers is a (symmetric) 
equilibrium if and only if 
1.  qⁿB≥c(q) and 
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2.  for all , the wage that a worker who individually deviates to  earns is such that 
wage minus the cost of that education, namely, c( ), is less than or equal to qⁿB-c(q). 
In other words, all workers earn enough to cover their education cost and no 
worker by unilaterally deviating to some other level of education can do better. 
To formalize condition (2), we need to describe what the wage a worker who 
unilaterally deviates to q when everybody else has chosen q, will earn. With a slight 
abuse of notation, denote this wage by and denote the profit of the firm hiring 
this person by .  Clearly, 
 
 
   The firm will hire this worker if and only if 
 
    Therefore,  is the maximum possible wage the worker can get while 
ensuring that the above inequality is satisfied. Otherwise the firm will refuse to 
employ this worker. It is now easy to derive that when all other workers have skill q, 
the wage of a worker with skill  will be given by: 
    [4] 
    What is interesting and makes our analysis easy to conduct is a property of w(q;q). 
The property is the following. The graph of as q changes is always given by 
the straight line that is tangent to w(q) (=qⁿB) at q. 
    What we are now ready to demonstrate is that this model can have multiple 
symmetric equilibria. In other words, it is possible to have a very low level of 
education which is an equilibrium in the sense that if everybody chooses it, nobody 
can do better by deviating, and there is also a possibility of a very high level of 
education in equilibrium. A society can simply get caught in a low literacy trap. 
Between two societies, one highly skilled and another with rudimentary skills there 
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may be no fundamental difference. They can be mere victims of their history. Using 
the property of w( ;q) mentioned above, these results are easy to prove. This can be 
done with a few simple examples; and that is what we do presently. The last section of 
the paper goes into the large policy implications for what the government could do to 
promote education and the acquisition of human capital and skills. 
Linear Cost Function and Literacy Trap 
    Consider a linear cost function for education as follows. Individuals are born with 
some level of skill, say z.  Alternatively, this is a level of skill that comes to us 
costlessly. Most human beings can perform basic tasks without having to undergo any 
formal training. To acquire skill beyond z, a worker has to incur a cost, which 
increases linearly with the level of skill. To sum up, the cost of education for attaining 
skill q is given by: 
     [5] 
where  is such that 
     [6] 
    The first assumption guarantees that the cost of education is neither very high so 
that no one chooses to get more skill than z, nor very low so that everyone chooses to 
become an expert. The second assumption guarantees that c(q)≤w(q) for all q∈[0,1]. 
    Define q such that 
 
or, 
 
    q is illustrated in Figure [3.1]. 
Claim 1 Every worker acquiring skill  and earning a wage of ⁿB is an equilibrium. 
Proof. Suppose all workers have chosen . We know that perfect competition 
among firms with free entry will drive wages to ⁿB. It has already been seen earlier 
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that firms offer the wage structure w(.;.) given by [4] optimally and none of the firms 
deviate from offering this. 
Let us now check how a worker, who unilaterally deviates from q will do. Note that by 
assumption [6], w( )≥c( ) and z< <1. Now, from [4], we have 
 
This implies that  is parallel to c(q) for all q∈[z,1]. This in turn means that 
 
But, . Therefore, 
 
Hence,  is an equilibrium. It is interesting to note that deviations to the interval [z,1] 
leave the deviating worker exactly as well off as before, and all other deviations make 
the worker worse off.  
 
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Claim 2 In this example, with linear cost function given by [5], there are two other 
equilibria, one in which all workers choose q*=z and another in which all workers 
choose q*=1. 
 
 
Figure 3-A 
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Proof.  First, suppose all workers choose q*=1 and one of them contemplates 
deviating from this common choice to a lower level of quality <1. Again the tangent 
line to the graph of w(q) at q*=1 gives the wage for obtaining quality . Now, for all 
< , the following is true: 
 
The inequality holds because w(q) is a convex function and =1> . Therefore, the 
loss in wages due to deviation to  from  more than offsets the cost savings since 
 is more steeply sloped than the cost function. Thus deviation would lead to a 
lower payoff. 
Similarly, if all workers choose q*=z, then deviation to >z is not advantageous since 
q*=z<  implies that 
 
Finally, deviation to <z lowers wages without reducing costs, so workers won't do 
that. 
    It is easy to see that there does not exist any other equilibrium apart from the three 
described above in this model with the linear cost function given by [5]. 
Literacy Trap and Big Push 
    Note that, while  is an equilibrium, it is not `stable' in the following sense. In a 
society where all the workers are skilled upto level , if it is possible to increase 
everyone's skill a little bit, then each of the workers will deviate further away from . 
That is, they will increase their skill; and note that this dynamic will continue till the 
equilibrium  is reached or gradually approached. On the other hand, if everybody's 
skill was lowered a little, then a downward dynamic would start up and society could 
go all the way to the equilibrium . 
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    Finally, we have a big `literacy trap' at the education-level which provides skill 
=z. A `big push' that drives the entire economy beyond the skill-level  can start up 
innate forces that will then take the economy all the way to the good equilibrium. All 
smaller efforts will keep pulling workers back to =z. This has one heartening 
implication. In an economy with widespread illiteracy, the cost of raising human 
capital may not be as much as appears at first sight. This is because the funding 
needed to promote education will not have to be sustained endlessly through time. As 
soon as a threshold is crossed, the accumulation of human capital and skills can be left 
to natural forces and will continue unabated. 
More General Cost Function and Literacy Trap 
 
     
 [curve.png] 
 [Non-linear cost function with multiple equilibria] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Though we illustrated our main results with the linear case, there is no need to 
confine the analysis to such cases. Virtually all results carry over to the more general, 
nonlinear cases. Consider the non-linear cost function as shown in Figure 3-B. As in 
 
Figure 3-B 
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case of linear cost function, suppose primary education that provides skill z is free. 
Then the cost of education increases at an increasing rate. After some point, the 
behavior of the cost function changes and as someone gets more educated, the less is 
his marginal cost of education. After a very high level of education, the marginal cost 
starts increasing again. 
    It is clear from the largely self-explanatory figure above that even with non-linear 
cost of education we may have multiple equilibria. In this particular example, we have 
two symmetric and strict Nash equilibria. As shown in Figure 3-b, .and   with 
firms offering wages w(.) given by [3] are the two Nash equilibria and both are stable. 
Thus a literacy trap may occur in a society where all the workers optimally choose to 
attain the skill . 
Policy Interventions 
    Increasing literacy and the advancement of human capital has been a major focus of 
policy-making certainly in developing countries but also in developed nations. 
Evidently, there are two sides to this policy. There has to be a demand for education 
on the part of parents taking decisions for their children and young adults taking 
decisions for their own education. Secondly, there has to be a supply of schools so that 
parents who wish to educate their children can do so. In popular discourse, it is often 
said that poor parents do not want to educate their children. This has met, rightly, with 
strong criticism (see PROBE Team, 1999). However, this must not blind us to the fact 
that the intensity of demand for education can vary and this can make a difference to 
the literacy outcome of a nation (see PROBE Team, 1999; Drèze and Kingdon, 2001). 
It is believed that the rewards from education -- the so-called `skill premium' -- have 
been rising in the developing world; and there is now some hard evidence on this (see 
Arbache, Dickerson and Green, 2004; Azam, 2009). When this happens, it is not 
surprising to find that the demand for getting education will also become stronger. It is 
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now said in India, given that missionary schools had historically played a major role in 
the country, that all you have to do is to think of a good English name, like John or 
Thomas or Mary and add the prefix "Saint" and suffix "School" to it; and you will be 
in the education business with students flocking to you. 
    In our model, it is easy to see that the same country where the demand for education 
is low because the skill premium is low can change to an equilibrium with high 
premium and high demand for education. In Figure 3-A, if we start from a case where 
the country is caught at a low literacy trap at z, it is not worthwhile for any individual 
to seek more education. The skill premium is just not high enough to make this 
worthwhile. If, on the other hand, education rises and goes past  for everybody, then 
people will invest even more in education and the nation will come to rest at a very 
high level of education for all. 
    Our model allows us to separate out the demand and supply aspects quite neatly and 
so enables us to take a more sophisticated view on policy. We can think of 
government-subsidized education as an intervention which lowers the cost of 
education. This can have interesting effects depending on how it is done. Suppose 
government gives a small flat subsidy s for all levels of education. Contrary to what is 
presumed, this may have no effect on education. This will be true for all the equilibria 
depicted in Figures 3-A and 3-B, excepting at z in Figure 3-A. To boost education, 
government has to vary the subsidy with respect to the level of education. In other 
words, the government needs to have a non-constant function s(q). The total cost of 
education is then given by [c(q)-s(q)]. By suitably altering the slope of s(q), the state 
can boost education. Indeed the net expenditure on education could be very small if 
the subsidy function is chosen artfully. If the economy is caught at equilibrium z in 
Figure 3-A, then a constant small subsidy will have a small positive effect on 
education. Beyond a critical point, it will have a huge effect, pushing skill acquisition 
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all the way to the maximum value 1, with no need for any subsidy in the new 
equilibrium. 
    The model suggests that the fiscal burden of boosting education may not be too 
high, because all we need is a short period boost, after which the natural incentives in 
the system kick in and little further outside intervention is needed. For this same 
reason, it may be worthwhile for a country caught in a low-literacy equilibrium to 
have a policy of compulsory education, which forces parents to educate their children. 
If this can be sustained for a while, the need for force will vanish since the high 
education of the rest of the population will raise the education premium for each 
individual. 
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Chapter 4 
A Note on Product Boycotts 
Introduction 
 Child labor persists in developing countries.  Unable to fathom that poverty 
and a lack of outside opportunities is the primary cause of families sending their 
children to work, many consumers in rich nations use product boycotts to reduce the 
incidences of child labor.  Although they may be full of good intentions, there is a 
large body of evidence showing that such consumer activism can be counter-
productive.  In particular, Basu and Zarghamee (2009) show that boycotting products 
made from child labor can lead to a decline in the child's wage rate.  Assuming that 
children work to cover a subsistence need of the family a decreased wage leads to an 
increase in child labor.  They call this paradoxical result the ‘backlash proposition’. 
 The theoretical arguments demonstrating the tenacity of child labor in the 
midst of poverty have been well documented.  Not as strong as the backlash 
proposition, Edmonds (2003) suggest that children would be hurt by sanctions if 
alternative activities were not provided and Baland and Duprez (2007) find that child 
labor labels can hurt the welfare of nations where child labor exist.  But why then is 
consumer activism against child labor so strong?  Theories that suggest that child labor 
standards are supported by firms purely from profit motives (see Davies, 2005) cannot 
explain the actions of consumers in rich countries willing to pay a premium for 
untarnished goods.   
 In this note the Basu and Zarghamee (2009) model is slightly extended so that 
the product boycotts effect on a good’s price level varies with the amount of children 
working in the industry.  The result is a weakening of their backlash proposition.  Due 
to a type of multiple equilibria different from those described by Basu and Van (1998), 
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the model’s predictions for the impact of consumer activism on child welfare depends 
on the economy’s initial equilibrium.  The ambiguous nature of the impact of 
consumer activism provides an explanation for why an altruistic consumer might 
continue to engage in activism against child labor in spite of the previous research 
highlighting its potential for negative welfare effects. 
 The note will first present the basic model and an explanation of the 
endogenous price, then an example with a linear production and close with a 
discussion. 
Basic Model-Endogenous Price Level 
 The model presented in this note follows Basu and Zarghamee (2009) except 
that it allows the impact of consumer activism on the relative price of tainted goods to 
vary with the amount of children engaged in the production process.  Consider the 
market for hand woven rugs.  Rugs that have been produced without child labor can be 
purchased for price p.  Then rugs that use child labor in the production process can be 
purchased for α p where α<1 when there is a preference for non-tainted rugs.  
Formally α is derived from utility maximizing behavior of consumers and α∈[0,1].  If 
α=1 there is no boycott, the method of consumer activism, and if α=0 there is a 
complete ban.   
 In order to allow the effect of consumer activism on prices to depend on the 
amount of child labor in the production process assume that α=α(c), where c is the 
aggregate level of child labor used in the rug industry.  One justification for this 
assumption is that consumers distaste for tainted goods is increasing in the number of 
children engaged in the industry.  A television ad saying "10 children in Bangladesh 
make rugs instead of attending school" is less provocative than one that replaces 10 
with 100,000.  As such, the impact on consumers shopping habits stands to be less.  If 
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shoppers do not change their habits then there would be little difference in the relative 
price of the two goods even though consumers have the same distaste for child labor.   
 A related reason for α=α(c) is the benefit to checking for rugs made with child 
labor.  When only a small share of the rug industry is made from child labor the cost to 
detection could easily outweigh its benefits.  In this case factories employing child 
labor could easily be sold undetected resulting in a relative price level close to one.  
As the number of child labor increases the benefit to inspecting starts to outweigh its 
cost and the relative price level begins to decrease. 
 In both of these cases a given level of consumer activism has a greater impact 
on the rug industry and consumer behavior as the aggregate level of child labor 
increases.  As a result α′(c)<05
Labor Market 
.  No further assumptions are made on α(c).  The result 
is a weakened backlash proposition and an example of consumer activism increasing 
child welfare in the case of a linear production function. 
 Turning to the labor market--there are N worker households each with one 
adult and m children.  It is assumed that adults supply their labor inelastically.  There 
is a subsistence level of consumption, s, that much be reached for the household to 
have a positive utility.  After reaching s the household only cares about the child's 
leisure, r.  Consistent with the luxury axiom proposed by Basu and Van (2009), the 
sole purpose of child labor is to secure a minimum income.  Thus children only work 
to make up for the adults inability to secure s.  This provides for the backward bending 
labor supply curve found in Basu and Zarghamee (2009) and here.  Here is a simple 
representation of these household preferences: 
                                                 
5 In many cases the monotonicity assumption made here would be inappropriate.  In the examples 
presented here the goods are being produced for the export market.  Otherwise, local norms become 
more important and information becomes less information resulting in α′(c)>0.  The first family to send 
the children to work might face great scorn and receive little pay but that scorn decreases if all families 
do it.   
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 Following Basu and Zarghamee (2009) wA the worker household's labor supply 
in adult units is given by: 
 
 With N identical households the aggregate labor supply is N*l(wA,, wC) where 
wA is the adult wage and wC is the child wage.  The one adult supply's her labor 
inelastically.  If her wage is high enough to cover subsistence then children do not 
work.  Also, if children are not paid a positive wage they do not work.  If, however, 
adult labor does not cover subsistence and child wages are positive then the children 
work to cover the shortfall in household income.  The child labor is converted to its 
adult equivalent by multiplying it by γ. 
 Now the firm’s problem and the separation result can be established.  The 
separation result is that firms hire either adults, or children, but not both.  Firms 
employ labor as the only input.  If X is the amount of output and L is the amount of 
adult equivalent units of labor then X=F(L) and L=A+γC where A is the amount of 
adult labor and C is the amount of child labor employed by the firm.  Later it will be 
assumed that the production function is linear in labor but for the purpose of the 
`separation result' only F(0)=0,F'(L)>0, and F"(L)≤0 is required.  
 The profit, Π, earned by a firm is given by: 
 
Lemma:  Let A and C denote the number of adults and children, respectively, hired by 
a firm.  Given α<1, there will exist no firm such that C>0 and A>0. 
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Proof:  A profit maximizing firm chooses the inputs that give the highest marginal 
product per dollar spent.  Suppose a firm hires A*>0 adults and C*>0 children.  It 
must be the case that γwA=wC.  Define A=A*+γC*.  It is shown below, a firm 
employing A adults and zero children would have greater profits than one that 
employs a positive amounts of both adults and children. 
 
 
 
 
 
As a result, no firm employs both child and adult labor. 
Linear Production 
 In the linear case F(L)=bL.  The focus is on child labor so assume b<s.  
Substituting αγwA for wC the aggregate labor supply can be written as a function of 
wA,l(wA)=N(1+γmin{m,((s-wA)/(αγwA))}).  The relationship between the amount of 
child labor provided by the household and the amount of consumer activism is given 
by, c(wA,α)=γmin{m,((s-wA)/(αγwA))}.  As children work for the purpose of satisfying 
a basic need, increases in consumer activism, modeled as shifts down in α(c), decrease 
the wages paid to children and increase the amount of work that they supply until all 
their labor is exhausted.  As the production function is linear the demand for labor is 
flat and any increase in supply corresponds to an increase in the equilibrium amount of 
child labor.  Figure 3-A shows how this results in the strong backlash proposition of 
Basu and Zarghamee (2009).  An increase in consumer activism implies lower prices 
for the boycott product leading to lower child wages.  As children work to meet 
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minimum consumption requirements, the luxury axiom, lower wages immediately 
imply higher child employment unless the economy began at a boundary where no 
more child labor could be supplied.  The result is that when the production function is 
linear consumer activism has either a neutral or negative impact on the amount of 
children employed and always has a negative impact on child welfare. 
 When the relative prices are allowed to vary, a shift down in the α(c) curve due 
an increase in consumer activism can have a positive impact on child employment and 
child welfare (see Figure 3-B).  With a linear production function labor markets 
always clear when wC=αγwA.  Equilibrium requires the expected price ratio to be 
fulfilled.  This implies α=α(c(wA,α)).  Figure 3-B shows that there are two points that 
satisfy this condition, each with different levels of child labor and different price 
levels for a given amount of activism.  Figure 3-B demonstrates that depending on the 
initial condition an increase in consumer activism can have beneficial effects on the 
amount of child labor, and child welfare.  The backlash proposition of Basu and 
Zarghamee (2009) has been weakened and the ambiguity of consumer activism in the 
child labor debate is further highlighted. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4-A 
 
 
Figure 4-B 
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Conclusion 
 On neither side of the child labor debate is there a clear cut, and simple 
solution to increasing the welfare of the worlds vulnerable, poor and young.  
Education is essential, but so is food and consumer activism can be a heavy and 
misguided hand.  So too is advice that says nothing can be done by individuals in rich 
countries.  Economists have made a point to show the problems of labor standards and 
consumer activism, this note shows even the ambiguity in those results.  There are 
cases when activism may help.  Given that, it is important to understand empirically 
when the economy is at a point where activism might succeed in increasing child 
welfare and decrease child labor. 
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